# 12 FAH-8 H-140 TYPES OF RESIDENCES AND SECURITY CHARACTERISTICS

(TL:RSP-03; 06-17-2002)

#### 12 FAH-8 H-141 TYPES OF RESIDENCES

- a. The various types of residence categories are:
- (1) Single-family dwellings;
- (2) Low-rise and high-rise apartments;
- (3) Compound and cluster housing;
- (4) Temporary lodging;
- (5) Ambassador's residence (EMR);
- (6) Principal officer's residence (POR); and
- (7) Marine security guard's residence (MSGR).
- b. There is no formal requirement for posts to limit staff housing to apartment dwellings or clustered housing. Such a policy is strongly recommended, and, in some cases, at high or critical political violence or crime threat posts, it may be required by the post's EAC. In general, an apartment dwelling offers the best opportunity to provide protection against criminal activity; whereas, single-family dwellings are the most vulnerable.
- c. As a result of the high cost of residential security, U.S. Government-owned and/or long-term leased property is preferred to ensure that the security investment is amortized.
- d. Whenever possible, security enhancements for both short and long-term leased properties should be financed by the landlord.

# 12 FAH-8 H-142 GENERAL RESIDENTIAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR POLITICAL VIOLENCE THREATS

(TL:RSP-01; 11-04-2001)

The following political violence residential security requirements are general in nature. Check 12 FAH-6, *Security Standards*, periodically to ensure that the most up-to-date, complete and accurate requirements are used for the residential security survey.

#### 12 FAH-8 H-142.1 Residential Security (All Residences) Requirements for Low Political Violence Threat Rating

(TL:RSP-01; 11-04-2001)

- a. The regional or post security officer's approval must be obtained prior to leasing or purchasing a residence.
- b. Preference will be given to residences, which maximize the safety and security of employees and have the following existing features:
  - (1) Illumination for all entrance areas and apartment hallways;
  - (2) Substantial doors at all entrances;
- (3) Door viewers or other means to permit the occupant to see a visitor without opening entrance doors;
- (4) RSO-approved deadbolt-type locks at all entrance doors, with a double-cylinder if the lock is within 40 inches (1 meter) of a glass sidelight or door window. The fire and/or safety aspect of keyed double-cylinder locks should be considered; and
- (5) Latching or locking mechanisms for all accessible windows and/or openings.

# 12 FAH-8 H-142.2 Residential Security (EMRs and PORs Only) Requirements for Low Political Violence Threat Rating

(TL:RSP-01; 11-04-2001)

a. The standards for all residences apply as well as the standards that follow: (**Note:** Should there be a conflict between any of the following standards and a standard for all residences, the higher standard will apply.)

- (1) For single-family dwellings, preference must be given to residences with a perimeter barrier, such as a wall or fence, which deters access to the property;
- (2) For newly acquired residences that are not on the embassy or consulate compound, the building exterior should be set back a minimum of 50 feet (15 meters) from any portions of the perimeter barrier or property line that are adjacent to roads or other areas to which unauthorized vehicles may gain access. For new residences on the chancery or consulate compound, the physical security standards for new on-compound housing apply (see 12 FAH-6 H-111.5);
- (3) Shatter resistant window film (SRWF) may be considered for those windows and glass doors that the RSO considers most vulnerable to an explosive attack, such as those facing a road; and
- (4) A residential safehaven may be considered by the RSO. Grilles deemed adequate for local conditions by the RSO are required on all accessible windows and/or openings of a safehaven. Existing window barriers, such as roll-down, or hinged shutters, if approved by the RSO, preclude the need for grilling a safehaven.

### 12 FAH-8 H-142.3 Residential Security (MSGRs only) Requirements for Low Political Violence Threat Rating

(TL:RSP-01; 11-04-2001)

The standards for all residences apply, as well as the standards that follow:

- (1) For stand-alone dwellings, preference must be given to residences with a perimeter barrier, such as a wall or fence, which deters access to the property, and
- (2) For newly acquired residences that are not on the embassy or consulate compound, the building exterior should be set back a minimum of 50 feet (15 meters) from any portions of the perimeter barrier or property line that are adjacent to roads or other areas to which unauthorized vehicles may gain access. For new residences on the chancery or consulate compound, the physical security standards for new on-compound housing apply (see 12 FAH-6 H-111.5).

### 12 FAH-8 H-142.4 Residential Security (All Residences) Requirements for Medium Political Violence Threat Rating

- a. Approval of the regional or post security officer must be obtained prior to leasing or purchasing a residence.
- b. Preference will be given to residences that maximize the safety and security of employees, while minimizing the need for security upgrades and/or personnel. Apartment buildings and cluster housing, solely or mostly occupied by U.S. Government personnel, may provide an opportunity to maximize post residential security resources; however, they also may be considered attractive targets for terrorist bombings or mob attacks. Therefore, the option of using apartment buildings or cluster housing as residences should be carefully considered in accordance with the Department's housing policy (see 6 FAM 727.3-4, Security Considerations) and the threat from terrorism and/or political violence.
- c. For single-family dwellings, preference will be given to residences with a perimeter barrier, such as a wall or fence, which deters access to the property.
- d. Preference must be given to residences with off-street parking. Ideally, the parking area should be secured in some manner.
  - e. All entrance areas and apartment hallways must be illuminated.
  - f. Each entrance will have a substantial door.
- g. Each entrance will have a door viewer or other means to permit the occupant to see a visitor without opening the door.
- h. Each entrance will have an RSO-approved deadbolt-type lock. A double-cylinder is required if the lock is within 40 inches (1 meter) of a glass sidelight or door window. The fire and/or safety aspect of keyed double-cylinder locks should be considered when installing this type of lock.
- i. Accessible windows and/or openings must have a latching or locking mechanism.
- j. SRWF should be considered for those windows and glass doors that the RSO considers most vulnerable to an explosive attack, if the possibility of that threat becomes substantial.

# 12 FAH-8 11-142.5 Residential Security (EMRs and PORs Only) Requirements for Medium Political Violence Threat Rating

(TL:RSP-01; 11-04-2001)

The standards for all residences apply as well as the standards that follow: (**Note:** Should there be a conflict between any of the following standards and a standard for all residences, the higher standard will apply.)

- (1) The perimeter will be protected by a barrier, such as a wall or fence, which deters access to the property and is equipped with appropriate gates;
- (2) For newly acquired residences that are not on the embassy or consulate compound, the building exterior will be set back a minimum of 50 feet (15 meters) from any portions of the perimeter barrier that are adjacent to roads or other areas to which unauthorized vehicles may gain access. For new residences on the chancery or consulate compound, the physical security standards for new on-compound housing apply (see 12 FAH-6 H-112.5);
- (3) SRWF should be considered for those windows and glass doors that the RSO considers most vulnerable to an explosive attack, such as those facing a road; and
- (4) A residential safehaven should be provided. Grilles deemed adequate for local conditions by the RSO are required on all accessible windows and/or openings.

### 12 FAH-8 H-142.6 Residential Security (MSGRs Only) Requirements for Medium Political Violence Threat Rating

(TL:RSP-01; 11-04-2001)

The standards for all residences apply as well as the standards that follow:

(1) For stand-alone dwellings, preference must be given to residences with a perimeter barrier, such as a wall or fence, which deters access to the property; and

(2) For newly acquired residences that are not on the embassy or consulate compound, the building exterior will be set back a minimum of 50 feet (15 meters) from any portions of the perimeter barrier or property line that are adjacent to roads or other areas to which unauthorized vehicles may gain access. For new residences on the chancery or consulate compound, the physical security standards for new on-compound housing apply (see 12 FAH-6 H-112.5).

# 12 FAH-8 H-142.7 Residential Security (All Residences) Requirements for High Political Violence Threat Rating

- a. Approval of the regional or post security officer must be obtained prior to leasing or purchasing a residence.
- b. Preference will be given to residences that maximize the safety and security of employees, while minimizing the need for residential security upgrades and/or personnel. Apartment buildings and cluster housing, solely or mostly occupied by U.S. Government personnel, may provide an opportunity to maximize post residential security resources; however, they also may be considered attractive targets for terrorist bombings or mob attacks. Therefore, the option of using apartment buildings or cluster housing as residences should be carefully considered in accordance with the Department's housing policy (see 6 FAM 727.3-4, Security Considerations) and the threat from terrorism and/or political violence.
- c. For single-family dwellings, preference must be given to residences with a perimeter barrier, such as a wall or fence, which deters access to the property. Apartment buildings and cluster housing (having six or more units), solely or mostly occupied by U.S. Government personnel, must have a perimeter wall or fence that deters access to the property and is equipped with gates.
  - d. Preference must be given to residences:
  - (1) Having multiple access routes to arterial roads; and
- (2) With off-street parking. Ideally, the parking area should be secured in some manner.
  - e. On the grounds adjacent to the building façade:
  - (1) All entrance areas, and apartment hallways must be illuminated;
  - (2) Each entrance will have a substantial door;

- (3) Each entrance will have a door viewer or other means to permit the occupant to see a visitor without opening the door; and
- (4) Each entrance will have an RSO-approved deadbolt-type lock. A double-cylinder is required if the lock is within 40 inches (1 meter) of a glass sidelight or door window. The fire/safety aspect of keyed double-cylinder locks should be considered when installing this type of lock.
- f. Grilles deemed adequate for local conditions by the RSO are required on all accessible windows and/or openings where patterns of violence commonly include forced entry. However, grilles may be provided for residences in housing compounds and for apartments above the first floor only where the RSO determines access control is inadequate. Existing window barriers, such as roll-down or hinged shutters or alarmed openings, if approved by the RSO, preclude the need for grilles.
- g. For grilled, occupied bedrooms below the fourth floor, a secondary means of escape must be present, in accordance with fire and safety regulations.
- h. SRWF must be considered for those windows and glass doors that the RSO considers most vulnerable to an explosive attack, if the possibility of that threat becomes substantial.
- i. Residences may be alarmed with DS-approved devices to protect accessible windows and/or openings and doors. However, residences in housing compounds and apartments above the first floor may be alarmed only where the RSO determines access control is inadequate.
- j. A central alarm monitoring system (CAMS) will be provided when used in conjunction with 24-hour react units in lieu of foot, static, or mobile residential guards, if locally effective, cost-beneficial to the U.S. Government, and technically feasible at post (see 12 FAH-6 H-521.1).
- k. A safehaven must be provided where the EAC determines that bcal incidents include forced entry into residences accompanied by physical harm to an occupant. Residences in housing compounds and apartments above the first floor are excluded where the RSO determines access control is adequate.
- I. For all apartment buildings planned for future occupancy solely or mostly by U.S. Government personnel, and cluster housing compounds having six or more units, the building exteriors must be set back at least 65 feet (20 meters) from any sections of the perimeter barrier that are adjacent to roads or other public access approaches to which a car or truck may gain access.

# 12 FAH-8 H-142.8 Residential Security (EMRs and PORs Only) Requirements for High Political Violence Threat Rating

(TL:RSP-01; 11-04-2001)

The standards for all residences apply, as well as the standards that follow: (**Note:** Should there be a conflict between any of the following standards and a standard for all residences, the higher standard will apply.)

- (1) The perimeter will be protected by a nine-foot (2.75-meter) high solid wall equipped with appropriate gates;
- (2) For newly acquired residences that are not on the embassy or consulate compound, the building exterior will be set back a minimum of 100 feet (30 meters) from any portions of the perimeter barrier that are adjacent to roads or other areas to which unauthorized vehicles may gain access. For new residences on the chancery or consulate compound, the physical security standards for new on-compound housing apply (see 12 FAH-6 H-113.5);
- (3) SRWF must be provided for those windows and glass doors that the RSO considers vulnerable to an explosive attack (**Note:** SRWF should not be applied to those already meeting ballistic and/or forced-entry requirements.); and
- (4) A residential safehaven must be provided. Consider 9-mm ballistic protection.

### 12 FAH-8 H-142.9 Residential Security (MSGRs Only) Requirements for High Political Violence Threat Rating

(TL:RSP-01; 11-04-2001)

The standards for all residences apply as well as the standards that follow:

(1) The perimeter will be protected by a barrier, such as a wall or fence, which deters access to the property and is equipped with appropriate gates; and

(2) For newly acquired residences that are not on the embassy or consulate compound, the building exterior will be set back a minimum of 50 feet (15 meters) from the perimeter barrier along those portions that are adjacent to roads or other areas to which unauthorized vehicles may gain access. For new residences on the chancery or consulate compound, the physical security standards for new on-compound housing apply (see 12 FAH-6 H-113.5).

### 12 FAH-8 H-142.10 Residential Security (All Residences) Requirements for Critical Political Violence Threat Rating

- a. Approval of the regional or post security officer must be obtained prior to leasing or purchasing a residence.
- b. Preference will be given to residences that maximize the safety and security of employees, while minimizing the need for residential security upgrades. Apartment buildings and cluster housing, solely or mostly occupied by U.S. Government personnel, may provide an opportunity to maximize post residential security resources; however, they also may be considered attractive targets for terrorist bombings or mob attacks. Therefore, the option of using apartment buildings or cluster housing as residences should be carefully considered in accordance with the Department's housing policy (see 6 FAM 72 7.3-4, Security Considerations) and the threat from terrorism and/or political violence.
- c. For single-family dwellings, preference must be given to residences with a perimeter barrier, such as a wall or fence, which deters access to the property. Apartment buildings and cluster housing (having six or more units), solely or mostly occupied by U.S. Government personnel, must have a perimeter wall or fence that deters access to the property and is equipped with gates.
  - d. Preference must be given to residences:
  - (1) Having multiple access routes to arterial roads; and
- (2) With off-street parking. Ideally, the parking area should be secured in some manner.
- e. The grounds adjacent to the building facade, all entrance areas, and apartment hallways must be illuminated.
  - f. Each entrance will have
  - (1) A substantial door;

- (2) A door viewer or other means to permit the occupant to see a visitor without opening the door;
- (3) An RSO-approved deadbolt-type lock. A double-cylinder is required if the lock is within 40 inches (1 meter) of a glass sidelight or door window. The fire and/or safety aspect of keyed double-cylinder locks should be considered when installing this type of lock.
- g. Grilles deemed adequate for local conditions by the RSO are required on all accessible windows and/or openings. However, grilles will be provided for residences in housing compounds and for apartments above the first floor only where the RSO determines access control is inadequate or where patterns of violence include forced entry. Existing window barriers, such as roll-down or hinged shutters or alarmed openings, if approved by the RSO, preclude the need for grilles.
- h. For grilled, occupied bedrooms below the fourth floor, a secondary means of escape must be present, in accordance with fire and safety regulations.
- i. SRWF must be considered for those windows and glass doors that the RSO considers vulnerable to an explosive attack, if the possibility of that threat is substantial.
- j. Residences will be alarmed with DS-approved devices to protect accessible windows and/or openings and doors. However, residences in housing compounds and apartments above the first floor may be alarmed only where the RSO determines access control is inadequate.
- k. A central alarm monitoring system (CAMS) will be provided when used in conjunction with 24-hour react units in lieu of foot, static, or mobile residential guards if locally effective, cost-beneficial to the U.S. Government, and technically feasible at post (see 12 FAH-6 H-521.1).
  - I. A residential safehaven must be provided.
- m. For all apartment buildings planned for future occupancy solely or mostly by U.S. Government personnel, and cluster housing compounds having six or more units, the building exteriors must be set back at least 65 feet (20 meters) from any sections of the perimeter barrier that are adjacent to roads or other public access approaches to which a car or truck may gain access.

# 12 FAH-8 142.11 Residential Security (EMRs and PORs Only) Requirements for Critical Political Violence Threat Rating

(TL:RSP-01; 11-04-2001)

The standards for all residences apply as well as the standards that follow: (**Note:** Should there be a conflict between any of the following standards and a standard for all residences, the higher standard will apply.)

- (1) The perimeter will be protected by a nine-foot (2.75-meter) high solid wall equipped with appropriate gates;
- (2) For newly acquired residences that are not on the embassy or consulate compound, the building exterior will be set back a minimum of 100 feet (30 meters) from any portions of the perimeter barrier that are adjacent to roads or other areas to which unauthorized vehicles may gain access. For new residences on the chancery or consulate compound, the physical security standards for new on-compound housing apply (see 12 FAH-6 H-I 14.5);
- (3) SRWF must be provided for those windows and glass doors that the RSO considers vulnerable to an explosive attack (**Note:** SRWF should not be applied to those already meeting ballistic and/or forced-entry requirements.); and
- (4) A residential safehaven must be provided. Nine-mm ballistic protection must be considered.

# 12 FAH-8 11-142.12 Residential Security (MSGRs Only) Requirements for Critical Political Violence Threat Rating

- a. The standards for all residences apply as well as the standards that follow:
- (1) The perimeter will be protected by a barrier, such as a wall or fence, which deters access to the property and is equipped with appropriate gates; and

- (2) For newly acquired residences that are not on the embassy or consulate compound, the building exterior will be set back a minimum of 50 feet (15 meters) from the perimeter barrier along those portions that are adjacent to roads or other areas to which unauthorized vehicles may gain access. For new residences on the chancery or consulate compound, the physical security standards for new on-compound housing apply (see 12 FAH-6 H-114.5).
  - b Preference must be given to residences having:
  - (1) Multiple access routes to arterial roads; and
- (2) Off-street parking. Ideally, the parking area should be secured in some manner.
- c. The grounds adjacent to the building facade, all entrance areas, and apartment hallways must be illuminated.
  - d. Each entrance will have:
  - (1) A substantial door;
- (2) A door viewer or other means to permit the occupant to see a visitor without opening the door; and
- (3) An RSO-approved deadbolt-type lock. A double-cylinder is required if the lock is within 40 inches (1 meter) of a glass sidelight or door window. The fire and/or safety aspect of keyed double-cylinder locks should be considered when installing this type of lock.
- e. Grilles deemed adequate for local conditions by the RSO are required on all accessible windows and/or openings. However, grilles will be provided for residences in housing compounds and for apartments above the first floor only where the RSO determines access control is inadequate or where patterns of violence include forced entry. Existing window barriers, such as roll-down or hinged shutters or alarmed openings, if approved by the RSO, preclude the need for grilles.
- f. For grilled, occupied bedrooms below the fourth floor, a secondary means of escape must be present, in accordance with fire and safety regulations.
- g. SRWF must be considered for those windows and glass doors that the RSO considers vulnerable to an explosive attack, if the possibility of that threat is substantial.

- h. Residences will be alarmed with DS-approved devices to protect accessible windows and/or openings and doors. However, residences in housing compounds and apartments above the first floor may be alarmed only where the RSO determines access control is inadequate.
- i. A central alarm monitoring system (CAMS) will be provided when used in conjunction with 24-hour react units in lieu of foot, static, or mobile residential guards if locally effective, cost-beneficial to the U.S. Government, and technically feasible at post (see 12 FAH-6 H-521.1).
  - j. A residential safehaven must be provided.
- k. For all apartment buildings planned for occupancy by MSG detachments the building exteriors must be set back at least 65 feet (20 meters) from any sections of the perimeter barrier that are adjacent to roads or other public access approaches to which a car or truck may gain access.

# 12 FAH-8 H-143 GENERAL RESIDENTIAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CRIME THREATS

### 12 FAH-8 H-143.1 Residential Security (All Residences) Requirements for Low Crime Threat Rating

- a. Approval of the regional or post security officer must be obtained prior to leasing or purchasing a residence.
- b. Preference will be given to residences, which maximize the safety and security of employees and have the following existing features:
  - (1) Illumination for all entrance areas and apartment hallways;
  - (2) Substantial doors at all entrances;
- (3) Door viewers or other means to permit the occupant to see a visitor without opening entrance doors;
- (4) RSO-approved deadbolt-type locks at all entrance doors, with a double-cylinder if the lock is within 40 inches (1 meter) of a glass sidelight or door window. The fire and/or safety aspect of keyed double-cylinder locks should be considered; and
- (5) Latching or locking mechanisms for all accessible windows and/or openings.

## 12 FAH-8 H-143.2 Residential Security (All Residences) Requirements for Medium Crime Threat Rating

(TL:RSP-03; 06-17-2002)

- a. Approval of the regional or post security officer must be obtained prior to leasing or purchasing a residence.
- b. Preference will be given to residences that maximize the safety and security of employees, while minimizing the need for security upgrades and/or personnel. Therefore, apartment buildings, apartment units and cluster housing should generally be favored over single-family residences, in accordance with the current Department's housing policy.
- c. For single-family dwellings, preference will be given to residences with a perimeter barrier, such as a wall or fence, which deters access to the property.
- d. Preference must be given to residences with off-street parking. Ideally, the parking area should be secured in some manner.
- e. The grounds adjacent to the building facade, all entrance areas, and apartment hallways must be illuminated.
  - f. Each entrance will have a(n):
- (1) Door viewer or other means to permit the occupant to see a visitor without opening the door; and
- (2) RSO-approved deadbolt type lock. A double-cylinder is required if the lock is within 40 inches (1 meter) of a glass sidelight or door window. The fire and/or safety aspect of keyed double-cylinder locks should be considered when installing this type of lock.
- g. Grilles deemed adequate for local conditions by the RSO are recommended for all accessible windows and/or openings. However, grilles may be provided for residences in housing compounds and for apartments above the first floor only where the RSO determines access control is inadequate or where patterns of violence commonly include forced entry. Existing window barriers, such as roll-down or hinged shutters or alarmed openings, if approved by the RSO, preclude the need for grilles.
- h. For grilled, occupied bedrooms below the fourth floor, a secondary means of escape must be present, in accordance with fire and safety regulations.

- i. Residences should be alarmed with DS-approved devices to protect accessible windows and/or openings and doors. However, residences in housing compounds and apartments above the first floor may be alarmed only where the RSO determines access control is inadequate.
- j. Where the threat of physical violence is common, a residential safehaven must be provided if accessible doors and windows/openings are not alarmed and grilled.

#### 12 FAH-8 H-143.3 Residential Security (All Residences) Requirements for High Crime Threat Rating

(TL:RSP-03; 06-17-2002)

- a. Approval of the RSO and/or PSO must be obtained prior to leasing or purchasing a residence.
- b. Preference will be given to residences that maximize the safety and security of employees, while minimizing the need for security upgrades and/or personnel. Therefore, apartment buildings, apartment units and cluster housing should generally be favored over single-family residences, in accordance with the current Department's housing policy.
- c. For single-family dwellings, preference will be given to residences with a perimeter barrier, such as a wall or fence, which deters access to the property.
- d. Preference must be given to residences with off-street parking. Ideally, the parking area should be secured in some manner.
- e. The grounds adjacent to the building facade, all entrance areas, and apartment hallways must be illuminated.
  - f. Each entrance will have a:
  - (1) Substantial door; and
- (2) Door viewer or other means to permit the occupant to see a visitor without opening the door.
- g. Each entrance will have an RSO-approved deadbolt type lock. A double-cylinder is required if the lock is within 40 inches (1 meter) of a glass sidelight or door window. The fire and/or safety aspect of keyed double-cylinder locks should be considered when installing this type of lock.

- h. Grilles deemed adequate for local conditions by the RSO are required on all accessible windows and/or openings. However, grilles may be provided for residences in housing compounds and for apartments above the first floor only where the RSO determines access control is inadequate or where patterns of violence include forced entry.
- i. For grilled, occupied bedrooms below the fourth floor, a secondary means of escape must be present, in accordance with fire and safety regulations.
- j. Residences will be alarmed with DS-approved devices to protect accessible windows and/or openings and doors. However, residences in housing compounds and apartments above the first floor may be alarmed only where the RSO determines access control is inadequate.
- k. A central alarm monitoring system (CAMS) will be provided when used in conjunction with 24-hour react units in lieu of foot, static or mobile residential guards if locally effective, cost-beneficial to the U.S. Government, and technically feasible at post (see 12 FAH-6 H-521.1).
- I. A safehaven must be provided where the EAC determines that botal incidents include forced entry into residences accompanied by physical harm to an occupant. Residences in housing compounds and apartments above the first floor are excluded where the RSO determines access control is adequate.

## 12 FAH-8 H-143.4 Residential Security (All Residences) Requirements for Critical Crime Threat Rating

(TL:RSP-03; 06-17-2002)

- a. Approval of the RSO and/or PSO must be obtained prior to leasing or purchasing a residence.
- b. Preference will be given to residences that maximize the safety and security of employees, while minimizing the need for security upgrades and/or personnel. Therefore, apartment buildings, apartment units and cluster housing should generally be favored over single-family residences, in accordance with the current Department's housing policy.
- c. For single-family dwellings, preference must be given to residences with a perimeter barrier, such as a wall or fence, which deters access to the property.
- d. Preference must be given to residences with off-street parking. Ideally, the parking area should be secured in some manner.

- e. The grounds adjacent to the building facade, all entrance areas, and apartment hallways must be illuminated.
  - f. Each entrance will have a:
  - (1) Substantial door; and
- (2) Door viewer or other means to permit the occupant to see a visitor without opening the door.
- g. Each entrance will have an RSO-approved deadbolt type lock. A double-cylinder is required if the lock is within 40 inches (1 meter) of a glass sidelight or door window. The fire and/or safety aspect of keyed double-cylinder locks should be considered when installing this type of lock.
- h. Grilles deemed adequate for local conditions by the RSO are required on all accessible windows and/or openings. However, grilles may be provided for residences in housing compounds and for apartments above the first floor only where the RSO determines access control is inadequate or where patterns of violence include forced entry.
- i. For grilled, occupied bedrooms below the fourth floor, a secondary means of escape must be present, in accordance with fire and safety regulations.
- j. Residences will be alarmed with DS-approved devices to protect accessible windows and/or openings and doors. However, residences in housing compounds and apartments above the first floor may be alarmed only where the RSO determines access control is inadequate.
- k. A central alarm monitoring system (CAMS) will be provided when used in conjunction with 24-hour react units in lieu of foot, static or mobile residential guards if locally effective, cost-beneficial to the U.S. Government, and technically feasible at post (see 12 FAH-6 H-521.1).
  - I. A residential safehaven must be provided.

# 12 FAH-8 H-144 GENERAL LOCAL GUARD STANDARDS FOR POLITICAL VIOLENCE THREAT RATING

# 12 FAH-8 H-144.1 Local Guard Requirements for Low Political Violence Threat Rating

(TL:RSP-01; 11-04-2001)

- a. One 24-hour guard will be provided for stand-alone EMRs where required to supplement host government support.
- b. Residences of individuals deemed by the EAC to be at extreme risk may be provided with a 24-hour fixed guard post and 24-hour mobile patrol coverage, if available. The EAC may request Department approval for one static guard at the residence of an individual whom the EAC deems to be at heightened risk. The post's request for Department authorization and funding should be addressed to DS/CIS/PSP/FPD and must clearly justify the EAC's heightened or extreme risk determination. Posts may respond without prior authorization only for short-term, exigent security needs.

# 12 FAH-8 H-144.2 Local Guard Requirements for Medium Political Violence Threat Rating

- a. One 24-hour guard will be provided for stand-alone EMRs where required to supplement host government support, a 12-hour foot patrol of the perimeter will be provided during the hours of darkness.
- b. One 12-hour guard post is provided to PORs, DCMRs, and MSGRs where required to supplement host government support.
- c. Where required to supplement host government support, one roving foot patrol is provided at residential compounds 12 hours per day during hours of darkness. The coverage will be extended to 24 hours a day only where the presence of a guard is required to operate access control devices.
- d. Where required to supplement host government support, mobile patrols are authorized for residences up to 12 hours per day during hours of darkness.

e. Residences of individuals deemed by the EAC to be at extreme risk may be provided with a 24-hour fixed guard post and 24-hour mobile patrol coverage, if available, or a 12-hour foot patrol. Residences of individuals deemed by the EAC to be at heightened risk may be provided a 24-hour fixed post during the period of increased risk as determined by the EAC. The post must request Department authorization and funding from DS/CIS/PSP/FPD. Posts may respond without prior authorization only for short-term, exigent security needs.

# 12 FAH-8 H-144.3 Local Guard Requirements for High Political Violence Threat Rating

- a. A 24-hour foot patrol of the perimeter is provided at EMRs, DCMRs, PORs, and MSGRs. Configuration and size of the compound and/or host government provided support may negate the requirement for roving foot patrols.
- b. One or more guard posts are provided at residential compounds 12 hours per day during the hours of darkness. The coverage will be extended to 24 hours a day only where the presence of a guard is required to operate access control devices.
- c. A 12-hour guard post will be provided at separate residences during the hours of darkness when the post EAC determines it is required to supplement mobile patrols and when the post and Department deem that other protective alternatives, such as a CAMS are not feasible, effective, or cost beneficial to the U.S. Government. When residences are provided with a CAMS, a 24-hour react force will be authorized in lieu of static guards. Final determination will be based upon a security assessment (See 12 FAH-6 H-521.1.)
- d. Mobile patrols are authorized for residences up to 24 hours per day.
- e. Residences of individuals deemed by the EAC to be at extreme risk may be provided with a 24-hour fixed guard post and 24-hour mobile patrol coverage, a 12-hour foot patrol, and counter-surveillance coverage. Residences of individuals deemed by the EAC to be at heightened risk may be provided a 24-hour fixed post and 24-hour mobile patrol. The post must request Department authorization and funding from DS/CIS/PSP/FPD. Posts may respond without prior authorization only for short-term, exigent security needs.

f. Residences that have been authorized guard coverage, and are temporarily unoccupied due to the absence of the employee, will continue to receive the same local guard coverage. Guards will be removed from vacant residences except at the EMR.

# 12 FAH-8 H-144.4 Local Guard Requirements for Critical Political Violence Threat Rating

- a. A 24-hour foot patrol of the perimeter is provided at EMRs, DCMRs, PORs, and MSGRs. Configuration and size of the compound and/or host government provided support may negate the requirement for roving foot patrols.
- b. Mobile patrols are authorized for residences up to 24 hours per day.
- c. A guard post will be provided at separate residences up to 24 hours a day when the post EAC determines it is required to supplement mobile patrols and when the post and Department deem that other protective alternatives, such as a CAMS are not feasible, effective, or cost beneficial to the U.S. Government. When residences are provided with a CAMS, a 24-hour react force will be authorized in lieu of static guards. Final determination will be based upon a security assessment. (See 12 FAH-6 H-521.1.) **Note:** The use of CAMS with static guards is not prohibited. Only in rare and fully justified cases will DS/CIS/PSP/FPD approve of such arrangements and provide funding.
- d. One or more guard posts are provided at residential compounds 24 hours per day.
- e. Residences of individuals deemed by the EAC to be at extreme risk may be provided with a 24-hour fixed guard post and 24-hour mobile patrol coverage, a 12-hour foot patrol, and counter-surveillance coverage. Residences of individuals deemed by the EAC to be at heightened risk may be provided a 24-hour fixed post and 24-hour mobile patrol, and 12-hour foot patrol coverage. The post must request Department authorization and funding from DS/CIS/PSP/FPD. Posts may respond without prior authorization only for short-term, exigent security needs.
- f. Residences that have been authorized guard coverage, and are temporarily unoccupied due to the absence of the employee, will continue to receive the same local guard coverage. Unless required by local circumstances, guards will be removed from vacant residences except at the EMR.

# 12 FAH-8 H-145 GENERAL LOCAL GUARD STANDARDS FOR CRIME THREAT RATING

## 12 FAH-8 H-145.1 Local Guard Requirements for Low Crime Threat Rating

(TL:RSP-01; 11-04-2001)

One 24-hour guard will be provided for stand-alone EMRs where equired to supplement host government support.

# 12 FAH-8 H-145.2 Local Guard Requirements for Medium Crime Threat Rating

(TL:RSP-01; 11-04-2001)

- a. One 24-hour guard will be provided for stand-alone EMRs where required to supplement host government support a 12-hour foot patrol of the perimeter will be provided.
- b. Where required to supplement host government support, one roving foot patrol is provided at residential compounds 12 hours per day during hours of darkness. The coverage will be extended to 24 hours a day only where the presence of a guard is required to operate access control devices.
- c. Where required to supplement host government support, mobile patrols are authorized up to 12 hours per day.

## 12 FAH-8 H-145.3 Local Guard Requirements for High Crime Threat Rating

- a. One 24-hour guard will be provided for stand-alone EMRs where required to supplement host government support, a 24-hour foot patrol of the perimeter will be provided.
- b. One or more guard posts are provided at residential compounds 12 hours per day during hours of darkness. The coverage will be extended to 24 hours a day only where the presence of a guard is required to operate access control devices.
  - c. A 24-hour mobile patrol will be provided.

- d. A 12-hour guard post will be provided at separate residences during the hours of darkness when the post EAC determines it is required to supplement mobile patrols and when the post and Department deem that other protective alternatives, such as a CAMS are not feasible, effective, or cost beneficial to the U.S. Government. When residences are provided with a CAMS, a 24-hour react force will be authorized in lieu of static guards. Final determination will be based upon a security assessment. (See 12 FAH-6 H-521.1.)
- e. Residences that have been authorized guard coverage, and are temporarily unoccupied due to the absence of the employee, will continue to receive the same local guard coverage. Guards will be removed from vacant residences except at the EMR.

# 12 FAH-8 H-145.4 Local Guard Requirements for Critical Crime Threat Rating

- a. One 24-hour guard will be provided for stand-alone EMRs where required to supplement host government support, a 24-hour foot patrol of the perimeter will be provided.
- b. One or more guard posts are provided at residential compounds 24 hours per day.
  - c. A 24-hour mobile patrol will be provided.
- d. A guard post will be provided at separate residences up to 24 hours a day when the post EAC determines it is required to supplement mobile patrols and when the post and Department deem that other protective alternatives, such as a CAMS, are not feasible, effective, or cost beneficial to the U.S. Government. When residences are provided with a CAMS, a 24-hour react force will be authorized in lieu of static guards. Final determination will be based upon a security assessment. (See 12 FAH-6 H-521.1.) **Note:** The use of CAMS with static guards is not prohibited. Only in rare and fully justified cases will DS/CIS/PSP/FPD approve of such arrangements and provide funding.
- e. Residences that have been authorized guard coverage, and are temporarily unoccupied due to the absence of the employee, will continue to receive the same local guard coverage. Unless required by local circumstances, guards will be removed from vacant residences except at the EMR.

#### 12 FAH-8 H-146 HOUSING CATEGORIES

#### 12 FAH-8 H-146.1 Single-Family Dwellings (SFD)

(TL:RSP-01; 11-04-2001)

- a. Single-family dwellings (SFD) include houses completely detached from other residences, townhouses or other multiple residential units that have individual entrances from the street directly into the residence. A SFD allows the occupant greater opportunities in establishing more rigid access control to the property. SFD residences are more difficult to secure adequately. There are, however, hardware modifications that will significantly improve the security afforded by a SFD.
- b. The main criterion used in selecting a SFD is the selection of an established residential development or neighborhood where income levels and lifestyles are more or less compatible. Neighbors' routinely looking out for each other is a critical part of a well-protected residential area. The environment should be such that a stranger, terrorist or potential criminal will stand out.
- c. There should be a clear distinction of boundaries, including streets, sidewalks, fences and gates, which makes intrusion into an area more obvious. Community aesthetics can also have a definite, although subtle and indirect, impact on the crime potential within the neighborhood. The visual quality of houses and landscaping and the level of care and maintenance they receive are usually related to the overall crime rate for an area. In areas where the homes are well maintained, the crime rate is generally lower.

#### 12 FAH-8 H-146.2 Apartments

#### 12 FAH-8 H-146.2-1 Apartment Benefits

- a. Given a choice between an apartment and a SFD, DS takes the position:
- (1) That an apartment offers greater protection against criminal intrusion;
- (2) An apartment, especially above the first floor, presents a more difficult target;
  - (3) An apartment provides the tenant some degree of anonymity;

- (4) An apartment provides the benefit of close neighbors; and
- (5) An apartment is almost always easier and less expensive to modify with security hardware.
- b. In the event of an emergency and loss of communications, neighbors can often be relied upon to come to another tenant's assistance. At the very least, they can call the authorities. An apartment above the second or third floor is preferred. (See M/OBO, *Fire Protection Guide*, for detailed information on fire safety standards for apartment buildings.)
- c. An important element in preventing crime in a high-rise apartment building is the presence of a doorman or concierge on a 24 hour basis. These individuals constitute a visible presence and provide a mechanism for screening entrants. An intercom system that allows the doorman or concierge to communicate with tenants in their apartment is important in enabling him to confirm the identity of guests and make further inquiries concerning strangers.
- d. In addition, not only is an apartment easier to secure, but the absence of the tenant is less obvious. These are important considerations for U.S. citizen direct-hire employees, who are away from post on temporary duty assignments, leave, home leave, or during post evacuations from the city.

#### 12 FAH-8 H-146.2-2 Apartment Disadvantages

(TL:RSP-01; 11-04-2001)

The security advantages of an apartment are usually superior to those of a SFD. There are, however, a variety of disadvantages, which should be considered when selecting an apartment:

- (1) The primary vulnerability of an apartment is the difficulty in controlling general access to the building or to the common areas. It can be difficult to identify strangers or others who may not have a legitimate reason to be in the building;
- (2) Normally, apartments have a limited number of entrances. Most commonly, there is a main entrance through a lobby, which leads to a bank of elevators or internal stairwell. The lobbies, elevators, and stairwells in some buildings, or at certain times, are not properly secured and are areas where robberies occur;
- (3) Stairwells and corridors may be poorly lit and access to them may be poorly controlled;
- (4) Because many families share the same building, it is difficult to challenge the presence of unknown persons;

- (5) Apartments usually have balconies that are often ideally suited to allow access to intruders, who may crawl across from another balcony, or lower themselves from a higher balcony. In many cases, the security hardware found on doors leading to these balconies is unsatisfactory;
- (6) Natural security features can be found built into the design of the lobby and the elevator area of a security conscious apartment building. A highly visible and well-lighted lobby makes loitering conspicuous. If the main entrance door is made of glass or other transparent material, a tenant will be able to view the entire area before entering (or departing) the building. There should be no areas that would provide hiding places for criminals. Good lobby visibility helps to deter crimes of personal confrontation
- (7) Elevator security is another important feature in an apartment building, but is almost entirely dependent upon the overall security of the building. If the elevator waiting area and the elevator cab are a visible extension of the lobby, the residents are afforded some protection. Secure apartment buildings often include closed circuit televisions (CCTVs), intercoms, emergency buttons, and mirrors for emergency use and to deter crime.

#### 12 FAH-8 H-146.3 Cluster Housing

(TL:RSP-01; 11-04-2001)

Cluster housing is defined as a housing situation in which several single-family dwellings or apartment buildings or a mixture of both are located in the close proximity or on the same acreage. At certain threat ratings, an acceptable cluster housing area should have a perimeter wall or fence that deters access to the property and is equipped with appropriate gates. With rare exceptions, U.S. Government direct-hire employees and their eligible family members should occupy every residence in a cluster housing area. Setback is a concern for newly acquired housing clusters. See 12 FAH-6 H-110, *Political Violence Security Standards*, for details.

#### 12 FAH-8 H-146.3-1 Cluster Housing Advantages

(TL:RSP-01; 11-04-2001)

The advantages of cluster housing include:

- (1) The benefit of close neighbors:
- (2) It is almost always easier and less expensive to modify with security hardware;

- (3) In the event of an emergency and loss of communications, other residents can often be relied upon to come to another tenant's assistance. At the very least, they can call the authorities; and
  - (4) The absence of the occupants of any residence is less obvious.

#### 12 FAH-8 H-146.3-2 Cluster Housing Disadvantages

(TL:RSP-01; 11-04-2001)

There are a few disadvantages to cluster housing which must be taken into consideration in selecting security enhancements.

- (1) Normally, clusters or compounds have a limited number of entrances. There is generally a main entrance that opens for access to all the residences and often only one or two other service entrances to the cluster or compound. This means that observation of the arrival and departure patterns and habits of residents is more easily obtained.
- (2) Clusters may have common areas that are difficult to secure against unauthorized entry.
- (3) Because many families share the same property, it becomes difficult to challenge the presence of strangers.
- (4) Cluster housing concentrates the number of U.S. citizen direct-hire employees living in one area. In the event of civil disturbance or terrorist activities targeted at the United States, cluster housing may increase the chances for an incident in that area.
- (5) Cluster housing in some countries includes lodging for servants. Crime and access control can often be a serious problem for residents in this kind of cluster housing.

#### 12 FAH-8 H-146.4 On-Compound Housing

(TL:RSP-01; 11-04-2001)

In some countries, residences for direct-hire employees are located on the same compound as **h**e chancery or other official facilities. In these cases, refer to 12 FAH-6 *Security Standards*, the chapter on compound housing, for requirements.

#### 12 FAH-8 H-146.5 Temporary Lodging

(TL:RSP-01; 11-04-2001)

- a. In certain countries, or at certain times, posts may encounter a severe housing shortage and permanently assigned staff may have to be housed in hotels, motels, or other housing designed for short-term occupancy. In these circumstances, the U.S. Government's responsibility for protection of a U.S. citizen direct-hire employee and their eligible family members should not receive any less attention than for those employees living in permanent quarters.
- b. The RSO and/or PSO must approve any hotel or other short-term residential facility used for housing of permanently assigned employees and/or their eligible family members. The RSO and/or PSO should use the same criteria as used for other forms of residences to ensure that the lodging provides a reasonable level of protection for the employee and/or eligible family members in accordance with the current threat rating for the post.
- c. Where the hotel or short-term residential facility does not provide an acceptable level of safety and security, lodging should not be approved. When no acceptable alternative exists then post should take whatever action(s) are appropriate to increase the safety and security of the employee and/or eligible family members. These actions may take the form of providing temporary fire, smoke or carbon monoxide detectors, additional or stronger locks, etc.
- d. Posts should consider providing prospective TDY visitors with information on security at hotels and short-term residences.
- e. The RSO and/or PSO is urged to work with the management of the hotel or short-term residential facility and the post's general service office (GSO) to create a security environment appropriate to the level of threat.

# 12 FAH-8 H-146.6 Ambassador's Residence (EMRs), Principal Officer's Residence (PORs), and Marine Security Guard Residences (MSGRs)

(TL:RSP-01; 11-04-2001)

a. The residences occupied by the COM, the PO and the MSGs are generally subject to a higher level of threat than residences occupied by other employees of the U.S. Government. They often have a higher visibility and are more of a target.

- b. These can be provided with additional security enhancements deemed necessary by the RSO, regardless of the threat rating for the post.
- c. If it is necessary to select a new residence for the COM, PO or MSG detachment, every possible effort should be made to ensure that the selection process results in a residence that meets all of the criteria equired for the safety and security of the occupants. There are many more factors involved in selecting a residence for a COM, PO or the MSG detachment than there are in selecting residences for other U.S. citizen direct-hire employees. The RSO must also approve of the final selection and be satisfied that all necessary security enhancements are in place and operating before the residence can be occupied.

#### 12 FAH-8 H-146.7 Exceptions to Set Back Requirements

(TL:RSP-01; 11-04-2001)

- a. RSOs and/or PSOs are required to make every effort to ensure that residences (EMRs, PORs and MSGRs in particular) meet the set back requirements for the threat rating at their post(s).
- b. When a post wants or needs to purchase or lease a residence that does not meet the threat rating required set back distances, the RSO and/or PSO must submit a request to DS/CIS/PSP/FPD for an exception to those standards. To request an exception, or for more information on exceptions, contact DS/CIS/PSP/FPD. The request for an exception should contain a full description of the property, including clear illustrations of areas that do not meet set back standards and reasons why this particular residence must be acquired or leased in spite of failure to meet set back standards. See 12 FAH-5 H-200, *Exception Requests*, for specific guidelines.
- c. The RSO and/or PSO is required to have an approved exception before he/she can approve the purchase or lease of any residence that does not meet set back distance standards regardless of the security acceptability or any other security concerns with the residence.

# 12 FAH-8 H-147 THROUGH H-149 UNASSIGNED